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FOREWORD 
This edited volume should appeal to anyone interested or actively involved in improving national 
security. It should also be of general interest to those responsible for major government 
programs, projects or policies. A valuable resource for scholars and practitioners, novices and 
experts alike, this book offers a comprehensive overview of Military Cost-Benefit Analysis 
(CBA). The goal is to help countries identify affordable defense capabilities that effectively 
counter security risks, in fiscally constrained environments. 
The book consists of five sections: I) Introduction and Problem Formulation; II) Measuring 
Costs and Future Funding; III) Measuring Effectiveness; IV) New Approaches to Military Cost-
Benefit Analysis; and V) Selected Applications. The seventeen chapters that make up these five 
sections are written by a diversity of international experts with both theoretical and hands-on 
experience.  Lifting the veil on military CBA, this volume offers several new practical tools 
designed to guide defense investments (and divestments), combined with a selection of real-
world applications.  
Widespread employment of CBA offers a unique opportunity to transform legacy defense forces 
into efficient, effective, and accountable 21st century organizations. A synthesis of economics, 
management science, statistics and decision theory, CBA is currently used in a wide range of 
defense applications in countries around the world: i) to shape national security strategy, ii) to set 
acquisition policy, and iii) to inform critical investments in people, equipment, infrastructure, 
services and supplies.  As sovereign debt challenges squeeze national budgets, and emerging 
threats disrupt traditional notions of security, this volume offers valuable tools to navigate the 
political landscape, meet calls for fiscal accountability, and boost the effectiveness of defense 
investments to help guarantee future peace and stability.  
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Military Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA): Theory & Practice 
F. Melese, A. Richter, and B. Solomon 
I. Background 
Military Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) offers a vital tool to help guide 
governments through both stable and turbulent times. As countries struggle with 
the dual challenges of an uncertain defense environment and cloudy fiscal 
prospects, CBA offers a unique opportunity to transform defense forces into more 
efficient and effective 21st century organizations. 
Defense reforms typically involve politically charged debates over investments 
(in projects, programs, or policies) as well as contentious divestment decisions—
from base realignment and closure (BRAC) to outsourcing and asset sales. A 
powerful contribution of CBA is to inform such complex and contentious 
decisions—carefully structuring the problem and capturing relevant costs and 
benefits of alternative courses of action. Lifting the veil on military CBA, this 
edited volume reveals several systematic quantitative approaches to assess defense 
investments (or divestments), combined with a selection of real-world applications. 
The frameworks and methods discussed in the following chapters should appeal 
to anyone interested or actively involved in understanding and applying CBA to 
improve national security. These valuable approaches also have broader 
government-wide applications, especially in cases where it is difficult to monetize 
the benefits of a public project, program, or policy. 
Unprecedented government spending to counter the global financial crisis has 
placed enormous pressure on public budgets. Combined with alarming 
demographics, many countries struggle to fulfill past promises to underwrite health 
care expenditures, social security payments, government pensions, and 
unemployment programs. As debt burdens grow to finance current operations, the 
risk of escalating interest payments threatens to crowd out vital future public 
spending. As the single largest discretionary item in many national budgets,1 
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military expenditures make a tempting target. Especially vulnerable are military 
and civilian compensation (pay and benefits) and the purchase and operation of 
equipment, facilities, services, and supplies. 
Anticipating future spending cuts, this book explores both conventional and 
unconventional approaches to contemporary defense decisions—from critical 
investments in facilities, equipment, and materiel to careful vendor selection to 
build, operate, and maintain those investments. Recognizing the value of 
systematic quantitative analysis, senior U.S. Army leadership has “directed that 
any decisions involving Army resources be supported by a CBA."2 
Faced with severe budget cuts and an uncertain threat environment, defense 
officials around the world confront urgent decisions on whether or not to approve 
specific projects (e.g. infrastructure—military housing; training, and maintenance 
facilities, etc.) or programs (e.g. weapon systems—Unmanned Aerial Vehicles 
(UAVs), Armored Personnel Carriers (APCs), Cyber Defense, etc.). Military CBA 
offers a valuable set of analytical tools to increase the transparency, efficiency, and 
effectiveness of critical defense decisions. 
A synthesis of economics, management science, statistics, and decision theory, 
military CBA is currently used in a wide range of defense applications in countries 
around the world: i) to shape national security strategy, ii) to set acquisition policy, 
and iii) to inform critical investments in people, equipment, infrastructure, 
services, and supplies. This edited volume offers a selection of carefully designed 
CBA approaches, and real-world applications, intended to help public officials 
identify affordable defense capabilities that effectively counter security risks in 
fiscally constrained environments. 
II. A Brief History of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
The French engineer Jules Dupuit (Dupuit 1844) is widely credited with an 
early concept of CBA called “economic accounting.” The British economist Alfred 
Marshall (Marshall 1920) later developed formal concepts that contributed to the 
analytical foundations of CBA.3 In a pioneering survey, Prest and Turvey indicate 
that as early as 1902 the U.S. River and Harbor Act required the Army Corps of 
Engineers to report on the desirability of any project, taking into account both the 
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cost and the amount of “commerce benefited” (Prest and Turvey 1965). 
Widespread application of CBA in the U.S. is generally attributed to the 1936 
Federal Navigation (Flood Control) Act. This required the Army Corps of 
Engineers to carry out projects to improve waterways when “the benefits to 
whomsoever they may accrue are in excess of the estimated costs” (Prest and 
Turvey 1965). 
At the heart of Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) is the economists’ concept of 
“allocative efficiency,” in which resources are deployed to their highest valued use 
to maximize social welfare. A related and intuitively appealing definition called 
“Pareto Efficiency” underpins CBA. An allocation is Pareto-efficient if no 
alternative allocation can make at least one person better off without making 
someone else worse off (Pareto 1909). 
The link between allocations that yield maximum net benefits in CBA and 
Pareto efficiency is straightforward: If a public policy, program, or project has 
positive net benefits, then it is possible to find a set of transfers (side payments) 
that make at least one person better off without making anyone else worse off. 
Unfortunately, transfers necessary to achieve Pareto efficiency are difficult to 
implement in practice. Therefore, out of practical necessity, CBA relies on a 
related decision rule called the Kaldor-Hicks criterion (Kaldor 1939; Hicks 1940). 
This decision rule states that a public policy, program, or project should be 
adopted, if and only if gainers could potentially fully compensate losers, and still 
be better off.4 
Application of this decision rule is relatively straightforward:5 Adopt all 
projects that have positive net benefits.6 An important caveat is that the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion only applies when costs and benefits can be monetized. Given the 
prevalence of non-monetary benefits in national defense, this poses a serious 
challenge for the security sector. 
The growing interest in CBA after WWII is often attributed to rapid 
developments in operations research and systems analysis—techniques that helped 
win the war by combining economics, statistics, and decision theory. Following the 
allied victory, Project RAND (launched in 1946 by the Army Air Corps) received 
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government funding to maintain scientific expertise developed in WWII and to 
conduct independent and objective research in national security. 
A key contribution of RAND’s research was “systems analysis” pioneered by 
Ed Paxson and advanced by Charles Hitch who in 1948 founded RAND’s 
Economics Division. Whereas operations research had a more immediate, wartime 
focus (e.g. finding the best short-run solution to a military mission, given a 
restricted set of equipment, etc. with specific characteristics), systems analysis was 
more future-oriented, focused on finding the optimal mix of doctrine, forces, 
equipment, etc. necessary to accomplish a military goal at the lowest possible cost 
(or alternatively, for a given budget, to find the optimal mix that maximizes 
defense capabilities). 
Working at RAND in the immediate post-war era, Hitch teamed with another 
economist, Roland McKean, to publish a pioneering text entitled “The Economics 
of Defense in the Nuclear Age” (Hitch and McKean 1960). The authors emphasize 
two main ways in which Military CBA can be applied: i) to guide defense policy 
(i.e. the allocation of resources between major missions or military goals) and ii) to 
guide defense investments (i.e. choices between alternative projects or programs to 
achieve a given mission/goal). A significant challenge in applying CBA to defense 
decisions is the complex and often controversial task of measuring “benefits.” 
At the highest national strategic level, “benefits” of a specific defense policy7 
might be measured in terms of its impact on long-term economic growth, peace, 
and prosperity—all key contributors to social welfare. For example, suppose 
resource costs to achieve specific military goals are viewed as insurance payments 
against hazardous states of the world. Suppose further that defense policy decisions 
that achieve specific military goals reduce risk premiums associated with domestic 
and foreign direct investment (FDI). Empirical evidence suggests FDI boosts 
economic growth and in turn contributes to peace and prosperity.8 In this example, 
high-level defense decisions could ideally be made with the aim of increasing 
social welfare by encouraging investment, boosting GDP, and thereby generating a 
virtuous cycle of peace and prosperity. 
In reality, this high-level effort to capture monetary benefits of defense policy 
as growth in GDP is rarely explored.9 Instead, it typically gives way to a more 
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familiar perspective that makes up the bulk of chapters in this edited volume—
where non-monetary “measures of effectiveness” (MOEs) of a policy, project, or 
program substitute for monetary benefits. 
Denied the opportunity to conduct controlled experiments, or full scale 
independent field tests to evaluate alternative policies, projects, or programs, 
military officials and analysts are forced to resort to “proxy” variables. These 
include criteria and characteristics that reflect multiple objectives and that describe 
essential features of the alternatives being analyzed.10 When benefits cannot be 
monetized, the terms “Systems Analysis” or “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis” are 
often used to describe Military CBA.11 
A related literature, alternately called Multi-criteria decision-making (MCDM) 
or Multi-objective decision-making (MODM), rapidly evolved after WWII to 
address the challenge of measuring non-monetary benefits of defense investments. 
The reader is encouraged to explore this literature for details on competing benefit 
measurement strategies, some of which are discussed in this volume. These 
measures have been in continuous development since the adoption of systems 
analysis by the U.S. Department of Defense in the early 1960s.12 
Following his election as President in 1960, John F. Kennedy appointed Robert 
McNamara Secretary of Defense. McNamara subsequently hired Charles Hitch as 
Comptroller to implement the Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System 
(PPBS) that Hitch had earlier helped develop at RAND. An output-oriented 
budgeting framework, PPBS relies heavily on systems analysis, or military CBA, 
to build a defense budget. 
Prior to Hitch’s tenure in the Office of Secretary of Defense, U.S. defense 
budgets were largely based on the Services’ (Army, Navy, Air Force) proposals for 
annual incremental increases in inputs or “appropriation” categories (Military 
Personnel, Procurement, Operations & Maintenance, Military Construction, etc.), 
often with little or no clear connection to defense outputs, joint missions, or 
national security goals. Having successfully employed a variant of PPBS called 
“program budgeting” as CEO of Ford Motor Company, McNamara recognized the 




The major innovation of PPBS is “Programming,” which bridges the gap 
between long-term military planning goals and short-term civilian budget realities. 
Designed as a constrained optimization underpinned by systems analysis, the 
“programming” phase was intended to produce a cost-effective mix of forces to 
maximize national security subject to funding constraints.13 
Under certain conditions, the optimal allocation of a budget across various 
inputs (e.g. defense resources) that contribute to a common goal (i.e. increasing 
national security) requires the marginal contribution of each input towards that 
goal, for a given incremental cost, to be the same for any input. Since this decision 
rule is independent of the units in which the goal is measured, in principle it 
provides a valid test for allocative efficiency, satisfies the condition for Pareto 
Optimality, and guarantees the most effective use of a defense budget.14 
To implement PPBS, Hitch hired a RAND colleague, Dr. Alain Enthoven, as 
Deputy Comptroller for Systems Analysis. In 1965, the impact of military CBA 
was reinforced when Dr. Robert Anthony of the Harvard Business School replaced 
Hitch as Comptroller and elevated Enthoven’s position to Assistant Secretary of 
Defense for Systems Analysis.15 Throughout his tenure, Secretary McNamara 
consistently applied systems analysis to evaluate policy, project, and program 
proposals from the military services and to build defense budgets submitted to the 
Congress.16 Military CBA continues to provide an analytical foundation that guides 
PPBS decisions in the U.S. and in countries around the world. 
It is clear that politics influences defense decisions. It is also true that public 
officials can manipulate CBA for their own personal strategic interests. Politicians 
likely win more votes highlighting a program’s benefits and downplaying its costs, 
and public administrators may be similarly rewarded. While it is clear pork-barrel 
politics often plays an important role in defense decisions, this book attempts to 
take the high road. It encourages the application of military CBA with a strict focus 
on national security interests.17 
While employment, income distribution, and regional impacts of defense 
investment decisions often play a role in political decisions, a clean CBA can 
inform the process by revealing the true (opportunity) cost of decisions that drift 
too far from the goal of making the best use of scarce resources for the security of 
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the country. Ideally, a carefully constructed military CBA focused strictly on 
national security concerns could be used to inform voters and counter special 
interest lobbying and rent-seeking that often leads defense firms to inefficiently 
spread production across key voting districts to promote their programs.18 
A risk for any military CBA is that benefit and cost estimates might be 
strategically manipulated by self-interested agencies or individual decision-
makers.19 As Robert Haveman and others have pointed out, politicians facing 
difficult re-election tend to prefer projects that concentrate benefits on particular 
interest groups that offer them support, and to camouflage or defer costs, or to 
spread them widely across the population. (Haveman 1976) Fortunately, as nations 
around the world embrace civilian control of the military, and citizens insist on 
greater accountability—including tighter linkages between budgets and security—
an increased premium is placed on transparency in defense decisions. 
While politics still dominates major defense decisions, the importance of 
military CBA rises alongside growing demands for transparency and 
accountability.20 Costly defense procurement scandals reinforce the need for 
objective CBA approaches to improve transparency in vendor selection decisions.21 
Meanwhile, painful recovery from the global financial crisis,22 combined with 
emergent threats, fuel public demand to carefully apply tools such as military CBA 
to build efficient, effective, and accountable security forces. 
III. Outline 
This edited volume reveals how military CBA can reduce budget pressures and 
improve defense decisions that contribute to national security. The dual purpose of 
CBA is to encourage more efficient and effective allocation of society’s scarce 
resources to increase social welfare.23 Governments often employ CBA to rank 
(mutually exclusive) portfolios of projects or programs. The typical CBA involves 
at least eight steps: 
1) The first step is to identify key decision-makers (and other stakeholders) to 




2) The second step is to carefully structure the problem and identify feasible 
alternatives that contribute to those goals/objectives and that satisfy the 
constraints. 
3) The third step is to determine the relevant time horizon over which the CBA 
will be conducted and to select an appropriate discount rate. 
4) The fourth step is to estimate relevant time-phased costs of each alternative 
over the relevant period. 
5) The fifth step is to forecast time-phased benefits that will accrue over the 
relevant period.24 This edited volume offers alternative approaches to 
structure a military CBA when benefits cannot be monetized. If benefits can 
be monetized, then the project or program with the highest Net Present 
Value (NPV) can be recommended.25  
6) The sixth step is to recognize uncertainty and conduct sensitivity analyses to 
determine whether results change with changes in key parameters (costs, 
benefits, budgets, discount rates, etc.).26 
7) The seventh step is to report the results of the analysis (rankings of projects, 
programs, etc., along with key assumptions). 
8) The final step is to make well-informed recommendations. 
These eight basic steps of a CBA are explored throughout the chapters of this 
edited volume. The book consists of seventeen chapters divided into five sections. 
Section I: Introduction and Problem Formulation 
This section includes the first four chapters. Chapter 1 which you are reading 
offers a broad overview and outline of the book. Chapter 2 entitled “Allocating 
National Security Resources” sets the strategic tone of the book through the lens of 
U.S. global security concerns. The Honorable J. Gansler (former U.S. Under 
Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology & Logistics) and his co-author 
W. Lucyshyn discuss challenges of: wide-ranging international threats, domestic 
budgetary restrictions, and ongoing acquisition problems—including questions 
about future capacity to support current acquisitions. Revealing a possible 
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mismatch between the National Security Strategy and the PPBS process, the 
authors highlight the need for military CBA at national, departmental, and program 
levels to make sound resource allocation decisions.27 They also stress the vital role 
played by CBA in the continual process of reassessment and innovation necessary 
to maintain critical linkages between resources and requirements and to guarantee 
effective forces in a dynamic security environment. 
In Chapter 3, a prominent U.K. pioneer in defense economics, K. Hartley and 
his Canadian senior defense scientist co-author B. Solomon (co-editor of this 
volume), confront the challenge of measuring defense outputs. While the 
economics approach discussed in “Measuring Defense Output: An Economics 
Perspective” is difficult to operationalize into a set of clear and unambiguous 
policy precepts, it does provide an important framework to help evaluate the 
benefits of defense outputs and activities. Combining theory and practice, the 
chapter describes attempts to measure defense outputs in the U.K., U.S., Australia, 
New Zealand, as well as in various European nations. Later chapters in this book 
provide several practical methods to help address challenges posed by the authors. 
While maintaining the strategic themes of Chapter 2 and recognizing 
measurement challenges discussed in Chapter 3, Chapter 4 by F. Melese offers a 
comprehensive set of military CBA approaches to structure public investment 
decisions. Entitled “The Economic Evaluation of Alternatives (EEoA),” six 
approaches are introduced that address a significant weakness in many 
conventional military “Analyses of Alternatives” (AoAs).28 Historically, while 
AoAs correctly focused on lifecycle costs and operational effectiveness to evaluate 
alternatives, “affordability” was an after-thought, at best only implicitly addressed 
in final stages of the analysis.29 In sharp contrast, EEoA encourages analysts and 
decision-makers to include affordability explicitly and up-front in structuring a 
military CBA. EEoA places taxpayers alongside warfighters in the defense 
decision-making process. This requires working with vendors to build proposals 
based on different funding (budget/affordability) scenarios.30 The Decision Map in 
the concluding section of Chapter 4 offers a comprehensive guide for practitioners 




Section II: Measuring Costs and Future Funding 
This section consists of three chapters. Chapter 5 entitled “Cost Analysis” 
focuses on the first of the three main components of an EEoA—Costs, Budgets, 
and Benefits. Having served as the U.S. Navy’s chief cost analyst, D. Nussbaum 
along with his co-author, Professor D. Angelis, discuss approaches to collect, 
analyze, and estimate costs of proposed projects, programs, or activities. A unique 
contribution of this chapter is the explicit recognition of “transaction costs.”32 
These include measurement, monitoring, management, contracting, negotiation, 
and other costs associated with government procurement. Depending on the nature 
of the transaction, it is conceivable that transaction costs could overwhelm the 
production costs of the desired product or service. Ignoring transaction costs 
creates a serious risk of underestimating the total costs of a project, program, or 
activity. In fact, the absence of transaction cost considerations in military CBAs 
may help explain the prevalence of cost overruns that often negatively impact 
expected returns on defense investments. To help address current biases and 
improve cost estimates in military CBAs, the authors recommend incorporating 
transaction cost considerations into traditional production cost calculations. 
Chapter 6 entitled “Advances in Cost Estimating : A Demonstration of 
Advanced Machine Leaning Techniques for Cost Estimation” presents recent 
technical advancements in cost estimation. The standard methods to estimate costs 
of defense systems in early design phases discussed in Chapter 5 include costing 
by analogy and parametric approaches. Analogy methods base the costs of new 
systems on historical costs of similar or “analogous” systems. The traditional 
approach is to ask subject matter experts to make subjective evaluations of 
differences between the new system and the old. This leads to the application of 
complexity factors to adjust the analogous (old) system’s cost to produce an 
estimate for the new system. Rather than apply subjectively obtained complexity 
factors, an innovative proposal by Defence Research & Development Canada 
scientist, B. Kaluzny, explores the use of machine learning algorithms to estimate 
the costs of systems in early design phases. The authors propose a cost estimation 
by analogy approach that involves an agglomerative hierarchical cluster analysis 
and nonlinear optimization that requires limited subjective input. With limited 
information, traditional parametric approaches to cost estimation rely on basic 
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statistical models to develop Cost Estimating Relationships (CERs) to help identify 
major cost drivers. CERs can be as simple as a ratio or involve linear regression 
analysis of historical systems or subsystems. The author proposes a new parametric 
technique, the M-system of Quinlan (a combination of decision trees and linear 
regression models), for learning models that predict numeric values. 
Having established the importance of treating affordability (or future funding 
constraints) up front in an economic evaluation of alternatives (EEoA), the 
challenge of forecasting long-term defense budgets is explored in Chapter 7. 
Colonel R. Fetterly and B. Solomon begin their chapter “Facing Future Funding 
Realities: Forecasting Budgets beyond the FYDP (future year defense plan)” by 
highlighting the importance of strategic management methods, such as 
Capabilities-Based Planning, to link existing military capabilities and force 
development goals to the future security environment. These strategic management 
approaches are coupled with a variety of forecasting models that take into account 
a nation’s security threats, income, spillover effects of allies’ defense posture, and 
competing demands for a limited public purse. The authors draw on data from a 
selection of NATO countries to develop several valuable budget forecasting 
models. 
Section III: Measuring Effectiveness 
The next two chapters offer a standard and novel approach, respectively, to 
develop military measures of effectiveness (MOEs). Chapter 8 entitled “Multiple 
Objective Decision-Making” focuses on practical, conventional methods used to 
structure a military CBA when faced with the challenge of quantifying non-
monetary benefits of defense projects, programs, or policies. Professors K. Wall 
and C. MacKenzie confront the challenge of non-monetary benefits leveraging the 
literature on multiple-objective (and multi-criteria) decision-making. The authors 
present a standard approach to help solve multiple-objective decision problems. 
Many contemporary decision problems in defense management and government 
resource allocation produce multiple, competing benefits. This chapter offers a 
widely employed approach in the Analysis of Alternatives (AoA). 
Chapter 9 offers a new, cutting-edge approach to conduct a military CBA 
focused on force protection investments. If the goal is to evaluate investments to 
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protect soldiers, then monetizing the benefits of lives saved can help save the 
greatest number of lives. In this chapter, entitled “A New Approach to Evaluate 
Safety and Force Protection Investments: Tradeoffs between Money Spent and 
Lives Saved,” Professors T. Kniesner, J. Leeth, and R. Sullivan cogently discuss 
how economists evaluate the benefits of safety investments by observing tradeoffs 
people actually make between safety and other job or product characteristics. The 
authors present a widely relevant application of their technique to evaluate the 
cost-effectiveness of adding armor protection to tactical wheeled vehicles. The 
value-of-statistical-life (VSL) approach presented in this chapter is an innovative 
military CBA technique highly recommended for future safety and force protection 
investments. 
Section IV: New Approaches to Military Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA) 
In Chapter 10, entitled “The Role of Cost-Effectiveness Analysis in Allocating 
Defense Resources,” Professor K. Wall joins forces with C.J. LaCivita and 
Professor A. Richter (a co-editor) to present a new CBA approach to solve multi-
level (multi-tiered) resource allocation problems. Their solution method re-
interprets the conventional Analysis of Alternatives (AoA) model with a twist. 
Applying standard operations research techniques, they incorporate bounded 
rationality to realistically portray how decision-makers can and do cope with the 
complexities of multi-level constrained optimization.33 The bounded rationality 
formulation employs subjectively assessed weights derived from the judgment and 
expertise of a central allocator (e.g. the Minister of Defense), that offer guidance to 
lower-level decision-makers (e.g. the Services: Army, Navy, Air Force) to balance 
costs and measures of effectiveness in building defense proposals. 
A new, groundbreaking military CBA approach is introduced in Chapter 11 
entitled “A Risk-Based Approach to Cost-Benefit Analysis: Strategic Real 
Options, Monte Carlo Simulation, Knowledge Value Added, and Portfolio 
Optimization.” Authored by renowned expert, J. Mun, and Professor T. Housel, 
their pioneering “real options” approach estimates military returns on investment 
(ROI), combining risk analysis concepts and portfolio optimization techniques. 
Two dramatic events unfolded in recent history that fundamentally transformed the 
contemporary security landscape—the collapse of the Soviet Union and the 
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tragedy of 9/11. From a single well-defined “Cold War” nuclear threat, countries 
now face a wide range of diffuse risks: anything from failed states, terrorism, and 
arms proliferation to human trafficking, piracy, and cyber-attacks. This historic 
shift in the national security environment prompted many countries to switch from 
“threat-based” planning to “capabilities-based” planning (see Fitzimmons 2007). 
With emerging threats harder to predict, strategic planners recommend 
diversification—building broad portfolios of flexible defense capabilities to 
counter a wide range of possible security concerns. Chapter 11 offers a new, 
unconventional approach to military CBA designed to help build “capability 
portfolios.” The strategic intent of the U.S. and other militaries is to maintain a 
military edge over rivals. Bureaucratic inertia and political lobbying by established 
defense firms, however, often result in too heavy a focus on prior conflicts. 
Research & Development (R&D) expenditures represent a real options approach to 
future contingencies where some, but not all research, is expected to lead to the 
development of new systems. R&D payments are similar to premiums paid for 
financial options in that they grant the government the right—but not the 
obligation—to exploit, defer, or abandon R&D investments. Periodic adjustments 
are made based on research results, new budget realities, and the evolving defense 
environment.34 This innovative chapter introduces hands-on applications of Monte 
Carlo simulation, real options analysis, stochastic forecasting, portfolio 
optimization, and knowledge value added. 
The real options approach attempts to make the best possible decisions under 
uncertainty and to identify, analyze, quantify, mitigate, and manage risks for 
military options. In Chapter 12 entitled “Extensions of the Greenfield-Persselin 
Optimal Fleet Replacement Model with Applications to the Canadian Forces CP-
140A Arcturus Fleet,” D. Maybury adapts other recent developments in financial 
modeling to construct a stochastic fleet replacement/overhaul model to predict the 
optimal timing of replacement. The chapter provides an interesting military 
application that features a popular maritime surveillance aircraft (the CP-140A 
Arcturus, a Canadianized version of the Lockheed P-3 Orion). 
Section V: Selected Applications 
14	  
	  
The last five chapters provide a selection of other valuable applications and 
lessons learned that correspond to the methods and concepts discussed in the 
preceding chapters. Chapter 13 entitled “Embedding Affordability Assessments in 
Military Cost-Benefit Analysis	  Analysis: Defense Modernization in Bulgaria” by 
V. Georgiev presents an application of the economic evaluation of alternatives in 
Bulgaria’s defense organization. The next two chapters each present real-world 
applications of Military CBA, and are authored by subject matter experts with 
direct experience in high profile defense programs. Former program manager J. 
Dillard joins forces with Professors D. Angelis and D. Ford to review development 
of the Javelin Anti-Tank Weapon System in Chapter 14 entitled “Real Options in 
Military Acquisition: A Retrospective Case Study of the Javelin Anti-tank Missile 
System.” Study director W. Greer reviews the C-17 strategic airlift program in 
Chapter 15 entitled “An Application of Military Cost-Benefit Analysis in a Major 
Defense Acquisition: The C-17 Transport Aircraft.” Whereas the former study 
provides a retrospective application of the “Real Options” approach, the latter 
offers a valuable historical perspective of traditional military CBA.  
In Chapter 16, entitled “Cost-Effectiveness Analysis of Autonomous Aerial 
Platforms and Communications Payloads,” Commander (USN) R. Everly, 
Lieutenant (USN) D. Limmer and Professor C. MacKenzie build a traditional 
military CBA to evaluate investments in Unmanned Aerial Vehicles (UAVs). The 
final Chapter by Economists J. Hanson and J. Lipow tackles a thorny issue: the so-
called “social rate of discount.” The debate among economists on whether, and by 
how much, to discount future costs in public procurement remains unresolved. 
Chapter 17 entitled “Time-discounting in Military Cost-Benefit Analysis (CBA)” 
cogently summarizes the literature and contrasts it with current guidelines 
published by the U.S. Office of Management and Budget. (U.S. OMB 1992) This 
final contribution offers valuable insights and a practical way forward that could 
help integrate the existing literature with government guidelines to improve the 
quality of military CBAs. 
IV. Conclusion 
Tight budgets make for hard choices. The greater the pressure on public budgets 
the greater the opportunity to apply military CBA. Today, the impact of 
15	  
	  
government deficits and debt on military spending is inescapable.35 As one of the 
largest discretionary items in government budgets, military spending is an obvious 
target for cuts. While wise use of military power can underpin economic growth, it 
is equally clear that economic strength underpins military power. Shrinking 
budgets place a renewed premium on affordability. As sovereign debt challenges 
squeeze national budgets, and emerging threats challenge existing security forces, 
this edited volume offers a valuable set of tools and techniques to help navigate the 
political landscape and meet calls to increase transparency, efficiency, and 
effectiveness in the defense sector. 
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  government	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2	  Office	  of	  the	  Deputy	  Assistant	  Secretary	  of	  the	  Army,	  U.S.	  Army	  Cost-­‐Benefit	  Analysis	  Guide,	  January	  12,	  2010,	  
p.6.	  In	  general,	  the	  U.S.	  Federal	  Government’s	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget	  (OMB)	  Circular	  A-­‐94	  provides	  
guidance	  for	  the	  application	  of	  CBA	  across	  the	  entire	  Executive	  Branch.	  DoD	  Instruction	  7041.3	  “Economic	  Analysis	  
for	  Decision	  Making”	  provides	  explicit	  guidance	  for	  the	  Department	  of	  Defense.	  
3	  Notable	  among	  these	  is	  the	  concept	  of	  “consumer	  surplus.”	  
4	  Note	  that	  this	  criterion	  does	  not	  require	  transfers	  to	  actually	  occur	  and	  is	  occasionally	  debated	  on	  equity	  grounds	  
(see	  Footnote	  10).	  
5	  Assuming	  policies,	  projects,	  or	  programs	  are	  independent	  and	  there	  are	  no	  binding	  constraints	  on	  inputs.	  
6	  In	  theory,	  selecting	  projects	  with	  positive	  net	  benefits	  maximizes	  aggregate	  wealth	  (e.g.	  GDP	  growth)	  which	  
indirectly	  helps	  those	  that	  might	  be	  made	  worse	  off.	  Moreover,	  an	  implicit	  assumption	  is	  that	  costs	  imposed	  on	  
some	  and	  benefits	  accrued	  to	  others	  will	  tend	  to	  average	  out	  across	  individuals.	  Where	  interactions	  occur	  among	  
projects,	  the	  general	  rule	  is	  to	  choose	  the	  combination	  of	  projects	  that	  maximizes	  net	  benefits.	  
7	  For	  example,	  benefits	  of	  a	  decision	  to	  allocate	  scarce	  financial	  resources	  among	  major	  military	  missions.	  
8	  For	  example,	  see	  Brooks	  (2005)	  or	  Gartzke	  (2007).	  
9	  Chapter	  3	  in	  this	  edited	  volume	  offers	  a	  notable	  exception.	  
10	  Examples	  of	  proximate	  criteria	  or	  partial	  measures	  of	  effectiveness	  include	  speed,	  operating	  range,	  weapons	  
accuracy,	  armor	  protection,	  etc.	  
11	  For	  example,	  see	  OMB	  Circular	  A-­‐94	  “Guidelines	  and	  Discount	  Rates	  for	  Benefit-­‐Cost	  Analysis	  of	  Federal	  
Programs”	  published	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget.	  Note	  that	  this	  edited	  volume	  will	  continue	  to	  
use	  the	  generic	  term	  Military	  CBA	  to	  refer	  to	  cases	  where	  benefits	  cannot	  be	  monetized.	  Although	  CEA	  also	  
produces	  a	  ranking,	  there	  is	  no	  explicit	  information	  about	  whether	  the	  highest	  ranked	  alternative	  would	  provide	  
positive	  net	  social	  benefits.	  If	  all	  alternatives	  are	  mutually	  exclusive,	  and	  the	  status	  quo	  is	  among	  the	  alternatives,	  
sharing	  similar	  scale	  and	  phasing	  of	  costs	  and	  benefits,	  then	  it	  is	  possible	  to	  apply	  CEA	  to	  select	  the	  most	  efficient	  
policy.	  
12	  Given	  the	  vast	  existing	  literature	  on	  building	  Measures	  of	  Effectiveness	  (MOEs),	  this	  book	  instead	  focuses	  on	  the	  
careful	  construction	  of	  Military	  CBAs.	  Although	  we	  occasionally	  explore	  the	  question	  of	  developing	  non-­‐monetary	  
benefit	  measures,	  we	  encourage	  the	  reader	  to	  review	  the	  extensive	  literature	  on	  Multi-­‐Criteria	  Decision	  Making	  
for	  alternative	  approaches	  to	  deriving	  such	  measures	  of	  effectiveness.	  (For	  example,	  see	  Keeney	  and	  Raiffa	  1976;	  
Buede	  1986;	  or	  Kirkwood	  1997)	  
13	  “The	  ultimate	  objective	  of	  PPBS	  shall	  be	  to	  provide	  operational	  commanders-­‐in-­‐chief	  the	  best	  mix	  of	  forces,	  
equipment,	  and	  support	  attainable	  within	  fiscal	  constraints”	  (DoD	  Directive	  7045.14	  May	  22,	  1984).	  The	  basic	  
questions	  of	  systems	  analysis	  are	  twofold:	  i)	  given	  a	  fixed	  budget,	  which	  weapon	  systems	  are	  most	  cost-­‐effective	  
and,	  conversely,	  ii)	  given	  a	  fixed	  military	  mission,	  which	  system(s)	  could	  generate	  the	  desired	  level	  of	  effectiveness	  
at	  the	  lowest	  cost?	  The	  basic	  ideas	  of	  PPBS	  were:	  "the	  attempt	  to	  put	  defense	  program	  issues	  into	  a	  broader	  
context	  and	  to	  search	  for	  explicit	  measures	  of	  national	  need	  and	  adequacy;"	  "consideration	  of	  military	  needs	  and	  
costs	  together;"	  "explicit	  consideration	  of	  alternatives	  at	  the	  top	  decision	  level;"	  "the	  active	  use	  of	  an	  analytical	  
18	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
staff	  at	  the	  top	  policymaking	  levels;"	  "a	  plan	  combining	  both	  forces	  and	  costs	  which	  projected	  into	  the	  future	  the	  
foreseeable	  implications	  of	  current	  decisions;"	  and	  "open	  and	  explicit	  analysis…made	  available	  to	  all	  interested	  
parties,	  so	  that	  they	  can	  examine	  the	  calculations,	  data,	  and	  assumptions	  and	  retrace	  the	  steps	  leading	  to	  the	  
conclusions”	  (Enthoven	  and	  Smith	  2005).	  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/commercial_books/2010/RAND_CB403.pdf.	  	  
14	  In	  practice,	  measuring	  contributions	  of	  various	  inputs	  towards	  a	  defense	  goal	  can	  be	  difficult	  and	  contentious,	  
and	  these	  desirable	  results	  only	  hold	  under	  the	  assumption	  (“homotheticity”)	  that	  optimal	  input	  ratios	  are	  
independent	  of	  the	  budget	  and	  depend	  only	  on	  relative	  costs	  of	  each	  input.	  It	  is	  also	  important	  to	  recognize	  
transaction	  costs	  associated	  with	  the	  application	  of	  military	  CBA	  (or	  systems	  analysis).	  For	  example,	  centralization	  
of	  decision-­‐making	  authority	  under	  Secretary	  of	  Defense	  Robert	  McNamara	  resulted	  in	  a	  proliferation	  of	  
management	  systems	  to	  collect	  data	  required	  to	  evaluate	  the	  costs	  and	  benefits	  of	  alternative	  projects	  and	  
programs	  (weapon	  systems).	  Increasingly	  buried	  in	  paperwork,	  the	  term	  “paralysis	  of	  analysis”	  was	  coined	  by	  some	  
members	  of	  the	  defense	  establishment	  (personal	  conversation	  with	  A.	  Enthoven).	  
15	  In	  1972,	  the	  Systems	  Analysis	  division	  evolved	  into	  the	  Office	  of	  Program	  Analysis	  &	  Evaluation	  (PA&E)	  and	  later,	  
in	  2009,	  into	  the	  Office	  of	  Cost	  Assessment	  &	  Program	  Evaluation	  (CAPE).	  Prior	  to	  his	  departure,	  Dr.	  Hitch	  launched	  
an	  OSD-­‐sponsored	  education	  institution	  to	  teach	  civilian	  and	  military	  managers	  in	  DoD	  (and	  partners	  and	  allies)	  
basic	  principles	  of	  PPBS	  and	  CBA.	  Today	  it	  is	  known	  as	  the	  Defense	  Resources	  Management	  Institute	  (DRMI)	  
located	  at	  the	  Naval	  Postgraduate	  School	  in	  Monterey,	  California.	  Two	  co-­‐editors	  of	  this	  volume	  (Dr.	  Melese	  and	  
Dr.	  Richter)	  are	  faculty	  members	  at	  this	  institution	  which	  celebrated	  its	  50th	  Anniversary	  in	  2015	  
(http://www.nps.edu/drmi/;	  http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/501035p.pdf).	  
16	  McNamara	  relied	  heavily	  on	  systems	  analysis	  to	  reach	  several	  controversial	  weapon	  decisions.	  He	  canceled	  the	  
B-­‐70	  bomber,	  begun	  during	  the	  Eisenhower	  years	  as	  a	  replacement	  for	  the	  B-­‐52,	  stating	  that	  it	  was	  neither	  cost-­‐
effective	  nor	  needed,	  and	  later	  he	  vetoed	  its	  proposed	  successor,	  the	  RS-­‐70.	  McNamara	  expressed	  publicly	  his	  
belief	  that	  the	  manned	  bomber	  as	  a	  strategic	  weapon	  had	  no	  long-­‐run	  future;	  the	  intercontinental	  ballistic	  missile	  
was	  faster,	  less	  vulnerable,	  and	  less	  costly.	  Similarly,	  McNamara	  terminated	  the	  Skybolt	  project	  late	  in	  1962.	  Begun	  
in	  1959,	  Skybolt	  was	  conceived	  as	  a	  ballistic	  missile	  with	  a	  1,000-­‐nautical	  mile	  range,	  designed	  for	  launching	  from	  
B-­‐52	  bombers	  as	  a	  defense	  suppression	  weapon	  to	  clear	  the	  way	  for	  bombers	  to	  penetrate	  to	  targets.	  McNamara	  
decided	  that	  Skybolt	  was	  too	  expensive,	  was	  not	  accurate	  enough,	  and	  would	  exceed	  its	  planned	  development	  
time.	  He	  claimed	  other	  systems,	  including	  the	  Hound	  Dog	  missile,	  could	  do	  the	  job	  at	  less	  cost.	  
17	  Our	  view	  is	  that	  a	  clean	  military	  CBA	  is	  a	  valuable	  starting	  point	  for	  political	  debates.	  Careful	  analysis	  can	  
constrain	  political	  attempts	  to	  turn	  defense	  spending	  into	  a	  jobs	  program	  or	  an	  opportunity	  to	  redistribute	  income.	  
Since	  there	  exist	  considerably	  more	  efficient	  and	  effective	  ways	  of	  promoting	  job	  growth	  and	  income	  distribution,	  
if	  these	  are	  the	  goals,	  then	  they	  should	  be	  stated	  explicitly	  and	  explored	  using	  a	  separate	  CBA.	  This	  may	  prove	  a	  
valuable	  avenue	  for	  future	  research.	  
18	  A	  recent	  example	  is	  the	  case	  of	  the	  F-­‐35	  aircraft	  program.	  Lockheed-­‐Martin	  claims	  to	  have	  “created	  125,000	  
U.S.-­‐based	  direct	  and	  indirect	  jobs	  in	  46	  states”	  http://www.businessweek.com/news/2014-­‐01-­‐22/lockheed-­‐
martin-­‐inflating-­‐f-­‐35-­‐job-­‐growth-­‐claims-­‐nonprofit-­‐says	  (downloaded	  March	  21,	  2014).	  
19	  Since	  costs	  (e.g.	  investment	  expenditures)	  tend	  to	  occur	  earlier	  with	  benefits	  appearing	  later,	  discount	  rates	  can	  
also	  be	  strategically	  selected	  to	  make	  projects	  appear	  more	  or	  less	  attractive.	  (See	  Chapter	  17)	  
19	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20	  For	  example,	  see	  NATO’s	  Building	  Integrity	  initiative	  at	  www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_68368.htm.	  	  
21	  For	  example,	  see	  Camm	  and	  Greenfield	  (2005).	  
22	  As	  public	  officials	  face	  growing	  resistance	  to	  tax	  increases,	  pressure	  increases	  to	  ensure	  governments	  work	  more	  
efficiently	  and	  effectively.	  
23	  National	  defense	  satisfies	  two	  key	  characteristics	  of	  a	  “public	  good.”	  It	  is:	  i)	  non-­‐rival	  and	  ii)	  non-­‐excludable.	  In	  
the	  former	  case,	  unlike	  private	  goods,	  if	  one	  person	  in	  a	  geographic	  area	  is	  defended	  from	  foreign	  attack	  or	  
invasion,	  his	  or	  her	  consumption	  is	  non-­‐rival	  in	  that	  others	  in	  the	  area	  can	  consume	  the	  same	  level	  of	  national	  
security	  for	  little	  or	  no	  additional	  cost.	  In	  the	  latter	  case,	  if	  one	  person	  is	  defended,	  others	  in	  that	  same	  area	  
cannot	  be	  excluded	  from	  the	  security	  benefits.	  This	  leads	  to	  a	  classic	  free-­‐rider	  problem	  making	  it	  difficult	  to	  
charge	  people	  for	  national	  defense.	  The	  key	  here	  is	  that	  whereas	  it	  is	  generally	  agreed	  the	  provision	  of	  national	  
defense	  is	  a	  public	  good	  that	  must	  be	  funded	  with	  taxes,	  the	  production	  of	  national	  defense	  depends	  on	  the	  
relative	  costs	  (including	  transaction	  costs)	  and	  benefits	  of	  public	  and	  private	  sector	  production,	  which	  can	  be	  
evaluated	  using	  Military	  CBA.	  
24	  Since	  benefits	  of	  proposed	  defense	  investments	  are	  often	  difficult	  to	  monetize,	  various	  approaches	  have	  been	  
developed	  to	  construct	  “measures	  of	  effectiveness”	  (MOEs)	  that	  capture	  the	  value	  or	  utility	  of	  alternatives.	  In	  
theory,	  the	  benefits	  of	  alternative	  defense	  investments	  could	  be	  monetized	  if	  their	  contribution	  to	  security	  and	  
stability	  encourages	  foreign	  direct	  investment	  that	  contributes	  to	  economic	  growth	  and	  social	  welfare.	  In	  practice,	  
precise	  linkages	  between	  defense	  investments	  and	  economic	  growth	  are	  difficult	  to	  establish.	  As	  a	  consequence,	  
the	  benefits	  of	  most	  military	  investments	  are	  not	  monetized,	  and	  instead	  various	  MOEs	  are	  constructed	  to	  conduct	  
a	  Cost-­‐Effectiveness	  Analysis	  (CEA)	  that	  is	  referred	  to	  in	  this	  volume	  as	  a	  Military	  CBA	  (e.g.	  see	  OMB	  Circular	  A-­‐94	  
published	  by	  the	  U.S.	  Office	  of	  Management	  and	  Budget).	  
25	  If	  benefits	  can	  be	  monetized,	  then	  calculate	  the	  discounted	  sum	  of	  net	  benefits	  (Benefits	  –	  Costs)	  from	  each	  
alternative	  over	  the	  specified	  time	  period,	  i.e.	  the	  discounted	  Net	  Present	  Value	  (NPV).	  For	  example,	  consider	  two	  
alternative	  military	  projects	  designed	  to	  achieve	  the	  goal	  of	  reducing	  the	  Navy’s	  fuel	  budget.	  Suppose	  there	  is	  a	  
fixed	  investment	  budget	  available,	  and	  the	  two	  mutually	  exclusive	  alternatives	  each	  require	  the	  same	  identically	  
phased	  investment.	  The	  first	  proposal	  is	  to	  invest	  in	  a	  program	  to	  convert	  ship	  propulsion	  from	  conventional	  diesel	  
to	  a	  less	  expensive	  bio-­‐diesel.	  The	  second	  proposal	  is	  to	  invest	  in	  an	  energy	  conservation	  program	  at	  Navy	  
installations.	  Since	  the	  two	  alternatives	  each	  require	  the	  same	  identically	  phased	  investments,	  the	  CBA	  can	  simply	  
focus	  on	  the	  stream	  of	  benefits	  (savings	  from	  cheaper	  fuel	  in	  the	  first	  case	  and	  reduction	  in	  fuel	  demand	  in	  the	  
second)	  that	  accrue	  from	  each	  project.	  Assuming	  a	  preference	  for	  present	  vs.	  future	  savings,	  the	  discounted	  
present	  value	  of	  each	  stream	  of	  savings	  can	  be	  calculated	  to	  determine	  the	  winning	  project.	  (See	  Chapter	  17)	  
26	  Alternatively,	  a	  “Real	  Options”	  approach	  could	  be	  adopted,	  conducting	  Monte	  Carlo	  simulations	  assigning	  
probability	  distributions	  to	  key	  parameters.	  (For	  example,	  See	  Chapters	  11	  and	  14)	  
27	  The	  authors	  also	  warn	  that	  until	  new	  mechanisms	  such	  as	  CBA	  are	  adopted	  to	  address	  the	  continual	  failure	  to	  
fuse	  requirements	  with	  necessary	  resources,	  DoD	  will	  essentially	  continue	  to	  create	  a	  disjointed,	  ineffective	  
framework	  for	  addressing	  national	  security	  concerns	  rather	  than	  the	  cohesive	  plan	  vital	  in	  confronting	  the	  
changing	  dynamics	  of	  modern,	  global	  warfare.	  
28	  See	  Ullman	  and	  Ast	  (2011)	  and	  OMB	  Circular	  A-­‐11	  for	  discussions	  of	  the	  Analysis	  of	  Alternatives.	  
20	  
	  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29	  In	  the	  U.S.,	  AoAs	  are	  conducted	  in	  early	  phases	  (milestones)	  of	  major	  defense	  acquisitions.	  Since	  they	  frequently	  
occur	  in	  early	  development	  before	  a	  project	  is	  fully	  funded,	  they	  rarely	  incorporate	  future	  funding	  forecasts.	  
Instead,	  the	  budget	  estimate	  for	  the	  program/project	  is	  generated	  as	  an	  output	  of	  the	  AoA.	  As	  major	  budget	  cuts	  
create	  funding	  challenges	  for	  new	  defense	  programs,	  “affordability”	  in	  terms	  of	  realistic	  budget	  constraints	  is	  
gaining	  increasing	  importance	  in	  AoAs.	  
30	  A	  key	  difference	  between	  traditional	  AoAs	  and	  EEoA	  is	  that	  instead	  of	  modeling	  competing	  vendors	  as	  points	  in	  
cost-­‐effectiveness	  space,	  EEoA	  solicits	  vendor	  offers	  as	  functions	  of	  optimistic,	  pessimistic,	  and	  most	  likely	  funding	  
(budget)	  scenarios.	  A	  formal	  mathematical	  model	  of	  the	  Economic	  Evaluation	  of	  Alternatives	  (EEoA)	  can	  be	  found	  
in	  Simon	  and	  Melese	  (2011).	  
31	  Following	  the	  recommended	  EEoA	  approach	  also	  provides	  a	  unique	  opportunity	  to	  achieve	  a	  significant	  defense	  
reform:	  to	  coordinate	  the	  Requirements	  Generation	  System,	  Defense	  Acquisition	  System,	  and	  Planning,	  
Programming,	  and	  Budgeting	  System	  (PPBS)—to	  lower	  costs,	  and	  improve	  performance	  and	  schedules.	  
32	  For	  example,	  see	  Williamson	  and	  Masten	  (1999)	  or	  Melese,	  Franck,	  Angelis,	  and	  Dillard	  (2007).	  
33	  Finding	  the	  optimal	  mix	  of	  forces	  to	  accomplish	  a	  military	  goal	  at	  the	  lowest	  possible	  cost,	  or	  alternatively,	  for	  a	  
given	  budget,	  to	  find	  the	  optimal	  mix	  that	  maximizes	  defense	  capabilities.	  
34	  The	  real	  options	  approach	  builds	  on	  what	  was	  previously	  referred	  to	  as	  incremental	  or	  “spiral”	  development	  of	  
military	  programs	  and	  projects.	  
35	  The	  response	  of	  many	  governments	  to	  the	  global	  recession	  was	  to	  bailout	  banks	  and	  businesses	  and	  to	  stimulate	  
their	  economies.	  Combined	  with	  falling	  tax	  receipts,	  this	  led	  to	  unprecedented	  increases	  in	  government	  spending.	  
The	  result	  in	  many	  countries	  transformed	  the	  financial	  crisis	  into	  a	  chronic	  sovereign	  debt	  crisis.	  Annual	  deficits	  
soared	  and	  cumulative	  debt	  loads	  reached	  unsustainable	  levels.	  Aging	  demographics	  in	  some	  countries	  
compounded	  the	  problem,	  placing	  impossible	  demands	  on	  social	  welfare	  programs	  and	  introduced	  further	  
pressure	  on	  government	  budgets.	  Combined	  with	  an	  uncertain	  threat	  environment,	  the	  fiscal	  crisis	  makes	  a	  
compelling	  case	  for	  widespread	  application	  of	  military	  CBAs	  to	  ensure	  future	  defense	  decisions	  to	  produce	  
efficient,	  effective,	  and	  accountable	  security	  forces.	  
